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Digital Images: Content and Compositionality 
 
Alistair M. C. Isaac 






Is there a distinctively imagistic form of content, with semantic characteristics different 
from those typically associated with linguistic content?  The view that there is has played 
an important role in debates about the nature of perceptual content, mental 
representation, aesthetics, and scientific realism.  Yet just what is it that is distinctive 
about imagistic content?  One popular line of inquiry into these questions has focussed on 
the apparently analog, continuously variable, or arbitrarily fine-grained nature of imagistic 
representation, contrasting it with the discreteness of typical accounts of language-like 
representation.  Different strands of this approach locate this fineness-of-grain in the 
vehicles of imagistic content, the content itself, or both.1  A second influential strategy 
takes pictorial representations to be paradigmatic images and concludes that imagistic 
content is essentially perspectival.2   
 The aim of this paper is to motivate an alternative account of the distinctive 
features of imagistic content by taking as primary data the synonymy relations that (we 
take to) obtain between digital imagistic representations.  The most familiar examples of 
digital images are those displayed and manipulated on our computer screens.  These 
images are (i) composed of a finite set of discrete elements (the “pixels”); and (ii) each of 
these elements may take on one of a finite set of discrete values (the “colors”).  Call any 
representation with these features and imagistic content a digital image.  Intuitively, two 
digital images are “synonymous” if we ascribe the same content to them.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Goodman (1976) gives the canonical account of analog symbol systems as syntactically and semantically 
dense, i.e. between any two symbols exists a distinct third symbol, and between any two represented classes 
is a distinct additional class.  Peacocke (1986) and Haugeland (1991) identify analog content as content 
specified within dimensions of variance.  The literature on non-conceptual content has emphasized the 
apparent fineness-of-grain of perceptual / imagistic experience (Gunther 2003). 
2 Since pictorial representation typically involves 2-dimensional projections of 3-dimensional scenes, and 
these are only defined with reference to a perspective point, some have argued it is essentially perspectival 
(e.g. Hopkins 1998: 36), or, abstracting from the restriction to a single perspective point, at least essentially 
aspectual (Lopes 1996: 124), and these conclusions have been extended to imagistic representation in general 
(van Fraassen 2008: Part 1).   
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 I demonstrate that synonymous digital images are related by a homomorphism 
that does not preserve exact color values, and only preserves color boundaries at a 
granularity coarser than that of the pixels themselves; this motivates the central claim of 
the paper, that images exhibit a distinctive compositional structure.  I argue that parts of 
an image always contribute in a systematic way to its overall content, i.e. images are always 
non-trivially compositional.  However, I also argue that there is a fineness-of-grain at 
which apparently content-bearing parts of the image do not uniquely contribute to overall 
content, i.e. images are never “inverse compositional.”  This conclusion differs markedly 
from the (typical) analog account of image content, on which details of an image bear 
content at an arbitrarily fine grain.  It also indicates a deep structural difference between 
language-like representations and images: languages may or may not be compositional, 
and they may or may not be inverse compositional; in contrast, images are always 
compositional, but never inverse compositional.  
 My method for defending this claim differs substantively from those of previous 
investigations in that it does not presuppose a particular theory of imagistic content.  Since 
compositionality is a relation obtaining between meaningful parts of a representation and 
its meaning as a whole, rigorous analysis of compositional structure does not require a full 
syntax or semantics, but merely a system of synonymy relations.3  The intuition is: if we 
can find a distinctive characteristic of images purely at this structural level, it will be 
completely general, and thus independent from any contingent features of particular 
systems of imagistic representation (though such systems may themselves exhibit analog or 
perspectival characteristics).  
There are compelling methodological reasons to focus attention on digital images.  
Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that most images are digital in the above sense—not just 
images on our computer screens, but traditional photographs as well, and arguably even 
paintings.  “Analog” photography captures images in a discrete array of light-sensitive 
silver halide crystals, either turned opaque or washed away during the process of 
development, and thereby acting as “pixels.”  Likewise, paintings and other real world 
images may be pixelated in the limit by their molecular structure.  Thus, the intuitively 
“analog” may in fact be “digital” in the technical sense!  If most (arguably all) actual images 
are digital, then it would seem mistaken to take analog images as paradigmatic.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For discussion, see Hodges (1998: 11); Pagin and Westerståhl (2010a: 253). 
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These claims are contentious, yet there are more mundane reasons to take digital 
images as the starting point for a theory of imagistic content.  We engage in a rich practice 
of content-preserving, mechanical manipulations of digital images: we resize images on 
our screens, print them to paper, and change their file type routinely, all in the expectation 
that content is preserved.  Every time we print or resize an image, we implicitly accept that 
the input and output of the algorithm our computer employs are synonymous, that they 
are in some suitable sense “the same” image.  My strategy is to begin from this de facto 
trust of algorithmic image manipulation, treat the outputs of such manipulations as strictly 
synonymous, and extract the distinctive features of imagistic representation implicit in 
these synonymy relations. !Thus, my target is not some Platonic concept of content, but 
rather the understanding of content implicit in our everyday interactions with actual 
images. 
I begin with some methodological preliminaries that qualify and motivate the 
notions of content and synonymy employed in the sequel.  Next, I survey the basic features 
of synonymous images presupposed by algorithmic image manipulation.  This motivates a 
more formal analysis of imagistic content as structure preserved across probabilistic 
homomorphisms, which in turn leads to the central argument of the paper, that imagistic 
representations are distinctive in that they are always compositional, but never inverse 
compositional.  I conclude by revisiting the claim that imagistic content is essentially 
perspectival, acknowledging a qualified role for perspective in delimiting, but not 
determining imagistic content. 
 
§2. Synonymy, transformations, and skeletal content 
 
How can study of synonymy between image vehicles inform a theory of image content?  
 In the abstract, synonymy relations partition a set of representations into 
equivalence classes, such that all members of any given class bear the same content.  If we 
know the equivalence classes, we can ask how representational vehicles in the same class 
are related to each other, and thereby hope to learn something about their content-bearing 
features.  One influential strategy has been to look at the transformations that take one 
member of a class into another member of the same—whatever stays invariant across all 
such transformations is a clue to the content and how it is borne by its vehicle.  
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 The idea that content identity, or at least meaningfulness, should be understood as 
invariance across transformations can be traced back to Felix Klein’s Erlanger Program.  
Klein unified disparate geometric systems by distinguishing and systematizing the 
transformations across which their objects remained invariant—for instance, in Euclidean 
geometry (unlike, say, projective geometry), the values of interior angles are part of the 
identity conditions for any triangle, and these only remain invariant across rigid rotations 
and translations of the plane.  This same basic idea has reappeared in the perceptual 
constancy literature (Cassirer 1944); the transformational grammars of Zellig Harris and 
Noam Chomsky; the formal theory of measurement (Luce, at al. 1990: Ch. 22); and 
Nozick’s final proposal to unify philosophy (2001).  Patrick Suppes explicitly argued that 
propositional content should be investigated by Erlanger-style analysis of invariance across 
transformation in his 1973 presidential address to the American Philosophical 
Association. 
 The strategy advocated by Cassirer, Nozick, and Suppes is especially apt for the 
study of the imagistic content of digital images for two reasons.  First, due to the practical 
demand for reproduction of imagistic content on different devices, at different sizes, and 
in different formats, content-preserving transformations over digital images have been 
rigorously honed and optimized.  Second, these transformations provide prima facie reason 
to doubt the equivalence of linguistic and imagistic content.  For digital images are stored 
as sentences in a language, namely the language governing the syntax of their file formats; 
in the simplest case, pixels may be named, a predicate assigned to each color, and the 
image specified by the conjunction of the formulae that attribute the correct color to each 
pixel.  Yet the everyday manipulations of a digital image that we take to preserve its 
imagistic content—resizing it on a screen, printing it to paper—do not preserve the 
linguistic content of these sentences.  Consequently, the semantics of digital images 
cannot be derived directly from the semantics of the programming languages in which 
they participate. 
 The synonymy relation over images implicit in our practices of mechanical resizing 
and reproduction is synonymy of a minimal kind of content, content considered 
independent of the use to which the image is put.  Haugeland (1991) calls this “skeletal” 
or “bare bones” content: “the strict content of a representation, that not augmented or 
mediated by any other.”  Haugeland contrasts this with the “full-blooded contents of 
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everyday representations[, which] are shaped and supported by their skeletal contents, but 
. . . fleshed out and enlivened through other influences” (185).  Haugeland’s distinction is 
suggestive, but hard to pin down.4  For our purposes, it will be helpful to take skeletal 
content as that which determines what an image is apt to depict, while fleshing out 
through background knowledge, context, or other nearby representations is necessary to 
specify what the image depicts simpliciter.  For instance, a particular pattern of colored 
pixels may convey skeletal content apt to depict a group of 15th century soldiers.  However, 
this skeletal content must be supplemented with conceptual knowledge and attention to 
the context of use if it is to be fleshed out.  Depending on the context and surrounding 
representations, such as a caption or nearby text, the same skeletal content may be fleshed 
out in a variety of ways, for instance as “generic scene from the Hundred Years’ War,” 
“Henry V addressing the troops at Agincourt,” or even “Kenneth Branagh as Henry V.”  
Nevertheless, the skeletal content remains unchanged as the image is duplicated, resized, 
and captioned; it is this skeletal content that ensures the image is apt to depict either a 
generic battle scene or a Shakespearean performance. 
 So, the remainder of this paper concerns imagistic skeletal content: that aspect of 
an image, preserved by our practices of mechanical reproduction and resizing, that 
determines what it is apt to depict.  In the interests of minimizing baroque 
circumlocutions, I often suppress the expression “apt to,” with the understanding that 
“image of x” is always shorthand for “image apt to depict x” unless otherwise specified. 
 By restricting attention to skeletal content, we avoid an influential argument that 
imagistic content is inherently perspectival because it depends on use.  Van Fraassen 
(2008) gives the example of a 1961 Doisneau photo of the Eiffel Tower: if it is used as a 
postcard, sent through the mail with writing on the back, it represents the Eiffel Tower, 
but reprinted in a book on photography, with suitable caption, it represents Doisneau’s 
famous photo Au Pont de l’Alma (20–1).  Van Fraassen concludes: “what it is an image of 
depends on the use, on what I use it to represent” (21).  But the postcard and the image in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Kulvicki (2006) discusses Haugeland’s suggestive notion in depth.  His “bare bones content” (BBC) shares 
many features with the interpretation offered here; in particular, he takes BBC to “articulate what pictures 
can be about” and holds that the BBC of a picture includes “a plane that is colored and shaped exactly like 
the [picture] itself” (59, c.f. Ch. 6).  The primary contrast between the present approach and Kulvicki’s is 
methodological: he defines BBC in terms of the representational system in which the picture participates 
(for instance, “linear perspective”); whereas here, skeletal content is derived from invariants across content-
preserving transformations, and thus does not need to be indexed antecedently to a particular 
representational scheme.   
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the photography book both comprise the same pattern of black and white parts; one may 
be transformed into the other through mechanical reproduction, and something about this 
pattern, some context-independent feature, renders it apt for representing a holiday view 
of Paris or Doisneau’s photo—that something is the skeletal content.  
 
§3. How synonymous images differ 
 
Everyday interactions with computers and printers illustrate how the imagistic content of 
a digital image is preserved across resampling.  Resampling is the process by which the 
same imagistic content is presented across different numbers of pixels or colors.  We 
resample to change image format, resolution, or “quality,” yet take these changes to 
preserve content, implying that there is some granularity at which the details of a digital 
image are not content-bearing.  
 Content-preserving transformations of images between format or display type 
generally involve changes to color space, and thus to exact color values, without thereby 
compromising skeletal content.  For instance, due to the physical differences between the 
additive color mixing of lights and the subtractive color mixing of pigments, printing a 
digital image to paper necessitates a change from an RGB (red-green-blue) color space to 
a CMYK (cyan-magenta-yellow-black) one.  Likewise, the same image file may realize 
different images if presented on different monitors, as monitors may differ in their RGB 
hardware, or the calibration that determines how image information is realized by that 
hardware.  Differently calibrated monitors may present the same image content as more or 
less saturated, lightened, or even shifted slightly across the color spectrum, without 
thereby changing what the image is apt to depict. 
 Changes in format also typically involve changes in resolution, the number of 
pixels that determine an image.  Upsampling enlarges an image to fill more pixels, while 
downsampling shrinks it into fewer pixels.  Both transformations employ sophisticated 
algorithms to ensure image content remains invariant.  In the case of upsampling, pixel 
color values must be interpolated carefully to prevent “pixelation,” the introduction of 
steps into smooth curves.  In downsampling, color values are determined for the smaller 
array of pixels through statistical analysis of corresponding larger patches in the source 
image.  This again is a complex procedure, which must be tuned to minimize the danger 
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of “aliasing,” the introduction of artifactual patterns into the image—for instance, the 
moiré pattern that distorts striped neckties on TV. 
 Crucially, downsampling may improve image quality, and thus fineness-of-grain 
simpliciter is no decisive measure of the accuracy with which imagistic content is conveyed.  
For instance, if there is noise in an image, i.e. stray pixels with random values that do not 
contribute to content presentation, this noise will be washed out by averaging over nearby 
pixel values during downsampling.  More generally, various algorithmic procedures for 
sharpening or blurring an image, i.e. systematically sampling regions and slightly 
reapportioning color values within them, may be taken to improve quality without altering 
content.  Unlike changes to color or resolution induced by a change in display format, 
these latter changes are typically instigated intentionally by an expert user—in the extreme 
case, applied only to select areas of the image, as in photo-retouching to “clean up” noisy 
or blemished photos.  Nevertheless, we typically take such photo-retouching to clean, 
improve, or reveal already present content, rather than impose or create new content, an 
attitude dramatically illustrated by the popular trope of police procedural fiction whereby 
algorithmic “sharpening” of blurry security camera footage “reveals” a perpetrator’s face or 
license plate (rather than “creating” or “introducing” it).  Such examples illustrate how we 
routinely accept images that differ in detail to nevertheless bear the very same content.   
 Does this conclusion go too far—may such radically different images bear precisely 
the same content?  The kind of image manipulation depicted in the police procedural is 
unrealistic: one may not in general recover fine-grained details from a coarsely pixelated 
source image, no matter how powerful one’s image processing software.  Likewise, in 
practice, we do not accept two images that differ radically in degree of blurriness or 
sharpness to bear precisely the same content.  Nevertheless, this very consideration cuts 
both ways, indicating, in the case of digital images at least, why we do treat images that 
differ in detail as bearing precisely the same content.  For consider again upsampling—the 
reason we have developed algorithms that interpolate pixel color values when increasing 
pixel number is to ensure that curves or gradations of color are presented with equal 
smoothness across any pixel number.  If a higher resolution image realizes precisely the 
same color regions down to the pixel level as a lower resolution one, then this will not be 
the case: smooth curves in the lower resolution image will be stepped, or pixelated, in the 
higher one.  Thus, equal smoothness (“blurriness”) over the curve as a whole demands a 
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change in “sharpness” near the pixel level.  More generally, since the complex challenges 
for up- or downsampling may be resolved in multiple ways by different algorithms when 
converting an image from one presentation format (or file type, or resolution, or “quality”) 
to another, and these strategies characteristically involve the statistical blurring or 
interpolating of color values across different arrangements of pixels, color boundaries are 
not deterministically preserved by these transformations; consequently, the 
correspondence between synonymous image parts is at best probabilistic or fuzzy. 
 This conclusion is inconsistent with a Goodman-style theory of imagistic content, 
which takes arbitrarily fine-grained details to be content bearing.  A defender of this 
approach will insist that the slightest change in image “quality,” number of pixels, 
saturation of colors, etc. corresponds also to a change in content.  Yet this view cannot be 
correct in the limit.  For, if we follow Goodman, then two prints from the same negative 
will not bear the same content, as their constituent silver particles will be arrayed in 
slightly different positions; two imprints of Hokusai’s Great Wave off Kanagawa will not 
bear the same content, as there are slight differences in the density and boundaries of their 
colors; and two high-quality digitizations of the same imprint of Hokusai’s Great Wave 
will not bear the same content if they are of slightly different resolutions, viewed on 
different monitors, or printed on different paper stock or with different inks.5 
 Goodman’s view provides an important metaphysical foil against which other 
theories of imagistic content may position themselves.  Nevertheless, it appears inadequate 
for explaining our prima facie content-preserving manipulations of images: we take 
resizing, printing, slight changes in color space, etc. to leave content unchanged, yet they 
all alter Goodman-style imagistic content.  Once we embark on the project outlined in the 
previous section, and take the algorithmic transformations of digital images as primary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 As an anonymous reviewer has stressed, Goodman’s canonical (1976) view may be supplemented to 
account for the intuition that images that differ only in small ways bear contents that also differ only in small 
ways—although at the cost of reintroducing Goodman’s bugbear: similarity, a point he himself seems to 
recognize: “ironically . . . a ghost of likeness, as nondifferentiation, sneaks back to haunt our distinction 
between pictures and predicates” (Goodman and Elgin 1988: 131).  However, in order to say that images 
that differ in small ways (e.g. two prints from the same negative) bear precisely the same content, a 
Goodman-style view must either take the images as participating in a syntactically disjoint symbol scheme, 
or as differing with respect to features that are not themselves bearers of content.  The former strategy would 
contradict Goodman’s own preferred account of digital images, on which they are images precisely in virtue 
of participating in a dense symbol scheme, only some members of which are pixelated (126–7).  The latter 
strategy is pursued by Bach (1970) and has close affinities to that developed here; the difference is that Bach 
takes some marks to be representational and others not, whereas here we restrict attention to pixels, and take 
the same arrangement of pixels to exhibit representational features at a coarse granularity, yet non-
representational ones at some finer grain.  
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data on synonymy relations, we are forced to accept a more coarse-grained account of 
image content.  Yet the difference between image features that bear content and those that 
do not is a difference of scale, not of kind.  The very same techniques that may be 
unquestionably employed to “clean up” blemished photos, improving the accuracy with 
which content is conveyed, become controversial when they are employed at a coarser 
grain, and thereby judged to alter the content of an image—as in fashion photography, 
where subtle changes in color boundaries may be used to alter the apparent shape of a 
model’s body to conform to perceived norms of beauty.  Such examples imply there is 
some granularity at which a boundary is crossed between content-bearing and non-
content-bearing aspects of a digital image.  It is this apparent boundary that is the key 
explanandum for an adequate theory of digital imagistic content. 
 
[Figure 1 about here; caption:   
Three synonymous images, differing at pixel level. (a) and (b) are different 
resolution digitizations of the same imprint of Hokusai’s “Great Wave off 
Kanagawa” (circa 1830), from the Metropolitan Museum of Art, cataloged JP1847. 
(c) is a digitization of a different imprint from the original printrun, also in the 




§4. Synonymy and structural similarity 
 
 If preservation of content across digital image manipulation does not require the 
precise reproduction of arbitrarily fine-grained details of the image, what does it require?  
A rough, intuitive idea is that the spatial structure of an image must be preserved across 
resampling if its content is to be preserved.  A manipulation of Hokusai’s Great Wave that 
inverts the relative positions of the wave and Mount Fuji, or deletes the fishing boats, 
clearly changes the content of the image by failing to preserve large-scale structural 
elements.  Detailed aspects of the image that bear content—the alternation of dark and 
light blues on the wave’s underside, the topknots on the passengers in the fore of the 
forward boat—likewise comprise more fine-grained structural relations between patches of 
color that must be reproduced if content is to be preserved.  This section aims to make 
these intuitions more precise, articulating a formal condition on image synonymy that 
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combines the demand for relatively fine structural similarity with the above insight that at 
some fineness-of-grain, detail no longer bears content. 
Call a strict linear order over pixels an “axis.”  Axes arrange pixels in “space,” 
whether space be understood as physical and extended or mathematical and abstract. 
While resampling doesn’t preserve exact pixel values, it does preserve the spatial 
arrangement of patches of color, i.e. axes are preserved.  Furthermore, not only pixel space, 
but color “space” as well exhibits determinate structure that is preserved across resampling.  
While uniform lightening changes absolute color values, it preserves the relations between 
colors.  Likewise, relative color values are preserved across transformations between 
different color spaces.  Color spaces may differ in relatively minor ways, for instance the 
RGB space used on Apple monitors and that used on NTSC television screens are defined 
by slightly different values for the hues of the component red, green, and blue dimensions; 
but color spaces may also exhibit large-scale structural differences, for instance RGB color 
space is 3-dimensional, while CMYK color space is 4-dimensional.  When we recognize 
these spaces as digital, i.e. divided into discrete-valued increments, we have no guarantee 
of exact correspondence between elements of one space and elements of another, no 
matter how similar their gross structure—at best colors from one space may be reasonably 
approximated in another.  Since color spaces are arranged such that nearby colors are close 
in appearance, however, we do have a guarantee that nearby colors in one space will be 
approximated by nearby colors in another.  Thus, the content-preserving relationship 
between color spaces is analogous to that between spatial arrangements of pixels: “axes” of 
elements ordered by similarity in one space correspond to axes of elements likewise 
ordered in another. 
 These considerations motivate the following characterization of the relationship 
between two digital images with the same imagistic content.  For any image with set of 
pixels X, call its color space CX, and the function which partitions it, assigning a unique 
color to each pixel, cX: X ⟶ CX. 
 
H If A and B are different digital representations, with the same imagistic content,  
 then there exist homomorphisms f: A ⟶ B and g: CA ⟶ CB, such that   
  i.) f maps the axes of A into axes of B 
  ii.) g maps the axes of CA into axes of CB 
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  iii.) there exist non-zero bounds δ and ε, such that for any pixel a in A,  
   cB(f (a)) is less than distance δ from g(cA(a)) with probability 1-ε.6 
 
Intuitively, clauses (i) and (ii) say that the pixels and colors of synonymous images may be 
placed in structural correspondence.  Yet (iii) says that this correspondence is not exact, 
but rather fuzzy, or probabilistic.  (iii) is needed to account for the examples discussed 
above, where a uniform patch of color in one image may correspond to a patch with slight 
variations in another, or a pixel of image “noise” may be present in one, but not the other, 
of a pair of synonymous images.  H is of interest not so much for what it says, but for 
what it doesn’t say; in particular, if we take everyday manipulations of digital images to 
determine synonymy, we cannot assert that content depends on precise details of the 
vehicle, i.e. we cannot assert that f and g are isomorphisms, nor that δ = ε = 0.  
Note that H applies also to 3-dimensional digital representations.  In that case, H 
will preserve structure in a spatial volume defined by three axes rather than the pictorial 
two, and the “colors” may be understood as a partition over this volume into those regions 
that are solid and those that are not (more generally into regions of different densities, or 
other distinguishing properties).  Consider the same design printed on two different 3-D 
printers with different resolutions; these two objects will be related homomorphically just 
as two pictures with the same content at different resolutions are.  Similar considerations 
apply to the scanning of parts of the body or brain by means of magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) or x-ray computed tomography (CT scanning)—the output of such scans 
is an array of 3-D pixels, or “voxels,” and content will typically be preserved across slight 
differences in scanning resolution or algorithmic filtering.   
 In general, H characterizes the relationship between synonymous digital images of 
arbitrarily high dimensionality.7  There are good reasons to develop a theory of imagistic 
content adequate for representations of any dimensionality.  For instance, perceptual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 I’ve suppressed formal details in the interests of space.  More formal versions of clauses (i) and (ii) will 
follow the standard definition of homomorphism (i.e. for a1, a2 ∊ A, a1 < a2 implies f (a1) ≺ f (a2), see Isaac 
(2013) for further details).  Clause (iii) requires a distance metric, which may be obtained by simply counting 
pixels or colors, since these are discrete, and a probability measure, which may be interpreted as relative 
frequency of color correspondence across all paired pixels in a set of synonymous images. 
7 But also arbitrarily low dimensionality!  For instance, digital audio recordings satisfy the definition of 
digital image and when synonymous (e.g. of the same performance) are related by H.  They convey 
“imagistic” content of a single dimension, with the (say) 44,100 samples per second understood as the 
“pixels” and the discrete-valued amplitudes assigned to each sample the “colors.” 
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content is often interpreted as imagistic, yet our perceptual experience is of a world 
extended in three dimensions.  The color spaces described above are in fact motivated by 
research on phenomenal color space, which, while frequently depicted in three 
dimensions, is actually at least 4-dimensional, probably more (Niederée 2010).  Russian 
director Andrei Tarkovsky characterized motion pictures as something like 4-dimensional 
images when he called filmmaking “sculpting in time.”  On a grander scale, Churchland 
(2012) argues mental representations are many thousand-dimensional “maps”—plausibly 
understood as bearers of imagistic content.  Each of these examples exhibits synonymy 
phenomena analogous to those uncovered for 2-dimensional digital images.  For instance, 
a movie displayed on a cinema screen at 24 fps, each frame lasting 1/48 of a second, is 
related by H to the “same” movie displayed on a 1080p HD monitor—we interpret them 
as bearing the same content even though the screen is dark half the time in the former 
case, but not the latter, and the exact pixelation changes with each frame in the former 
case and never in the latter.  Churchland’s view faces the difficult task of explaining how 
the high-dimensional mental maps defined by neural activation may bear the same (or 
even similar) content across different brains, despite involving different numbers of 
neurons, and thus dimensions (110ff)—observing they are related by H suggests a start at 
answering this question. 
 
§5. The basics of (inverse) compositionality 
 
Just like images, synonymous linguistic representations are homomorphic.  However, the 
structure preserved by the relevant homomorphism differs: intuitively, the (syntactic) 
surface structure of synonymous linguistic representations may be quite different, yet the 
semantic roles filled by morphemes still correspond precisely.  Conversely, H dictates that 
synonymous images will share gross (spatial) surface structure, yet the correspondence 
between their color boundaries may be fuzzy rather than precise.  I argue that these 
disanalogies indicate a general structural difference between imagistic and linguistic 
representations, with respect to the contribution the parts of a vehicle make to overall 
meaning.  This section introduces the relevant concepts for articulating this difference: 
compositionality and inverse compositionality.  
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 Compositionality is a property that characterizes the contribution of the parts of a 
representation to its meaning: 
 
A representation is compositional if and only if its overall content (meaning) is a 
function of the contents of its parts and the structural relations between them.8 
 
It is easy to construct language-like representations that are trivially compositional.  
Consider for instance a system of maximally precise symbols, with no internal syntactic 
structure; such a system would convey linguistic content, and do so in a characteristically 
linguistic way.  For instance, a propositional “language” with atomic proposition letters, 
but no logical connectives, would convey content of essentially the same form as that of a 
full propositional language, yet be “compositional” only in the trivial sense that none of its 
representations have meaningful parts.  The content so conveyed would still be 
characteristically linguistic in that it is assigned to elements of the language in the same 
way as for a full-fledged propositional language, i.e. by an interpretation function from 
symbols to propositions. 
 What about languages that contain complex expressions with meaningful parts?  
The consensus is that such languages need not be compositional, and for any particular 
language, it is a contingent fact whether that language is compositional or not.9  
Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that some form of compositionality obtains for the case 
of greatest interest, natural language.  If natural language were not compositional, then the 
ease with which we learn it, successfully interpret novel expressions, and produce our own 
novel utterances would be mysterious.  There are difficulties for a compositional account 
of natural language, however.  If a language is non-compositional, then it contains “a 
complex expression that changes its meaning when some of its constituents are replaced by 
synonymous ones” (Westerståhl 2015: 9).  There are well-known instances of such 
expressions in natural language, for instance opaque contexts such as “Jo believes x”: x may 
be replaced with a synonymous expression, and yet the truth conditions (overall meaning) 
of the sentence change.  There is an active research program to find compositional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See Hodges (1998) for a canonical statement of the formal notion of compositionality and Pagin and 
Westerståhl (2010a; 2010b) or Szabó (2013) for surveys.   
9 A minority holds that it is trivially true that all languages are compositional, see Westerståhl (1998) and 
Pagin and Westerståhl (2010b) for surveys and rebuttals.  This claim is more convincing for special 
languages subject to a priori constraints, e.g. the “language of thought.” 
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analyses of examples such as this, with a host of technical strategies available for 
generating compositional interpretations of purported counterexamples, for instance by 
adding hidden variables or “lifting” semantic types (Zimmermann 2012; Johnson 
forthcoming). 
 If a representation is compositional, then substituting parts of the representation 
synonymously won’t change its meaning.  An even stronger notion of compositionality 
applies if substitution of parts non-synonymously always changes meaning.  This stronger 
condition obtains only when the function from the meanings of parts to overall meaning is 
injective, i.e. never maps different combinations of meaningful parts to the same overall 
meaning.   
 
A representation is inverse compositional if and only if its overall content (meaning) 
is an injective function of the contents of its (atomic) meaningful parts, and the 
structural relations between them.10 
 
Inverse compositionality says of overall meaning that it is unique modulo the synonymy 
classes of atomic meaningful parts, where the atomic meaningful parts of a representation 
are just the smallest component bearers of meaning.  In the linguistic case, these are 
morphemes—so, while “color” and “colour” differ in atomic orthographic components 
(letters), they are nevertheless completely synonymous as atomic bearers of meaning, both 
presenting the content [color] by different conventions.   
 Inverse compositionality was introduced to explain aspects of communication and 
thought that appear to require a stronger condition than compositionality.  For instance, 
Pagin (2003) argues that, while compositionality may explain how a hearer is able to 
comprehend a complex expression, it doesn’t help explain how a speaker is able to generate 
complex expressions in the first place.  Beginning from a (complex) meaning she intends 
to express, the speaker must choose words to compose a suitable expression.  How she 
does this is a mystery unless there is a function from overall intended meaning to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This notion is also known as “reverse compositionality” (Fodor and Lepore 2001).  I follow here the 
terminology of Pagin (2003; Pagin and Westerstähl 2010a) as formally this is the inverse of the regular 
notion of compositionality.  Compositionality says there is a function from meanings of parts to meanings of 
wholes, whereas inverse compositionality says there is a function from meanings of wholes to meanings of 
parts.  This is equivalent to the statement in the text since a function is injective just in case its inverse is also 
a function.  
! 15!
meanings of parts, i.e. unless the inverse of compositionality holds.  Similar considerations 
motivate Fodor and Lepore, who worry that, while compositionality explains how anyone 
who understands “dog” and “bark” understands “dogs bark,” inverse compositionality is 
needed to explain how anyone who understands “dogs bark” also understands “dog” and 
“bark.”  They gloss the required principle as “each constituent expression contributes the 
whole of its meaning to its complex hosts” and assert that “as far as anybody knows, 
compositionality and [inverse] compositionality always go together” (2001: 366, emphases 
in original).  Nevertheless, inverse compositionality places a strong requirement on a 
semantic system, and just as the compositionality of natural language is a matter of debate, 
so also is its inverse compositionality (e.g. Johnson 2006). 
 So, language-like representations may or may not be compositional, and they may 
or may not be inverse compositional.  It is worth closing this section with a reminder that 
we are concerned here with skeletal content, content a representation bears independent of 
other representations or contextual background.  One of the most compelling lines of 
argument against compositionality turns on the apparent context-sensitivity of familiar 
conversational examples—if meaning is determined by context of utterance, then it does 
not appear to be a function of the meanings of the parts of the expression.  However, such 
context-sensitive meaning will be part of the full-blooded content of the expression, not 
its skeletal content.  The skeletal content of an expression, sometimes thought of as “what 
is said,” may be “impoverished,” perhaps not even characterizing a full proposition (Szabó 
2013: 4.2.3), yet still provide scaffolding to support whatever full-blooded contents 
context may impose (Bach 1994).  One might consistently maintain both that full-
blooded content is non-compositional, and that skeletal content is (inverse) compositional, 
determined by / determining the skeletal meaning of the expression’s parts. 
 
§6. Are digital images (inverse) compositional? 
  
I argue that, in contrast to language-like representations, images are both always (non-
trivially) compositional and never inverse compositional. 
 Images are always non-trivially compositional.  This follows because images always 
have internal structure, and content-bearing properties of this structure contribute to 
overall content.  More specifically, clause (i) of H implies that synonymous images have 
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the same structure, i.e. that structure is somehow critical for determining overall content.  
Clause (ii) implies that parts of synonymous images must be assigned analogous colors.  
Insofar as color values in some sense determine the content of image parts, (i) and (ii) 
together imply that overall content is a function of the contents of parts and their 
arrangement, i.e. images are compositional.  
 More intuitively, the status of an image as an image depends upon some structured 
“depiction” of contents—whether those contents are real or imagined, concrete or abstract.  
An image apt to depict a cat on a mat must involve some component corresponding to the 
cat and some component corresponding to the mat, and these components must stand in a 
relation corresponding to on-ness, or it is simply not an image of a cat on a mat.  While 
the state of affairs that the cat is on the mat may by stipulation be represented with an 
unstructured proposition letter p, stipulation cannot ensure p bears the imagistic content 
that a cat is on a mat, and we can see this because p does not stand in relation H to images 
of cats on mats.  Likewise, an abstract Mondrian grid of colors, such as Tableau I, while 
not (obviously) depicting any (recognizable) subject, nevertheless depends for its identity 
qua image on a particular spatial arrangement of color patches and lines, and this same 
imagistic content may be represented by many distinct replicas of Tableau I, synonymously 
related by H.11  At stake again is skeletal content: the phrase “Great Wave off Kanagawa” 
may indexically refer to the same content as Figure 1a under the right circumstances, but 
its skeletal content is determined by the semantics of English, while the skeletal content of 
Figure 1a is determined by a spatial arrangement of color patches— “Great Wave off 
Kanagawa” is not imagistically synonymous with Figure 1.  
 The claim that the contents of image parts plus their spatial arrangement 
compositionally determine the content of the image as a whole has been defended many 
times for the special case of maps, although opinions differ on whether the compositional 
structure of maps is the same sort as that of language (Casati and Varzi 1999; Blumson 
2012) or qualitatively different (Camp 2007; Rescorla 2009).  The stronger claim that all 
images exhibit compositional structure has been defended less frequently, although an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Although abstract examples such as this are “non-representational” in the sense of not depicting 
recognizable objects (although even that claim may be contentious or indeterminate—consider for instance 
Mondrian’s own Broadway Boogie Woogie), this does not mean they are not “representations” in the more 
general sense of objects that convey meaning and thus demand a vehicle/content distinction.  In this more 
general sense, we must treat abstract paintings (and musical recordings, footnote 7) as representations in 
order to make sense of the cultural practices in which they participate, especially our practice of reproducing 
them and treating distinct reproductions as in some sense “the same”—i.e. the same in content. 
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exception is Blumson (2014).  Blumson argues that images are compositional “since one 
may proceed by rational inductive means from knowing what some pictures represent to 
knowing what other pictures composed of the same parts represent” (115).   
 Two key issues distinguish the position advanced here from other defenses of 
image compositionality.  First, the target is different—the focus here is the 
compositionality of skeletal content, whereas others have addressed full-blooded content.  
Blumson’s argument, for instance, invokes content attributions that rely on knowledge of 
the content of other representations, i.e. the kind of knowledge that fleshes out content.  
Second, the methodology is different, since my starting point is a given set of synonymy 
relations, rather than the principles of a particular representational scheme.  This 
difference is nicely illustrated by the different role played by homomorphism in this 
approach and that of, say, Camp: Camp derives image compositionality from the 
homomorphism that obtains between an image vehicle and its content (2007: 156–9); in 
contrast, I derive image compositionality from the homomorphism that obtains between 
any two image vehicles bearing the same content.  
 Images are never inverse compositional.  This is a corollary of clause (iii) of H.  A 
representation violates inverse compositionality if non-synonymous replacement of an 
atomic meaningful constituent may leave overall meaning unchanged.  Clause (iii) says 
that fine-grained parts of two digital images may differ in (relative) color value, even when 
images are synonymous.  I argue that color patches are plausible atomic meaningful 
constituents of digital images, and that their synonymy conditions depend on color value, 
since in some contexts a change in the color of a patch produces a change in content.  
Nevertheless, in other contexts, the very same change in color of an equivalent patch (i.e. 
non-synonymous replacement of an atomic constituent) may leave overall content 
unchanged. 
 In the literature on image compositionality, a classic worry has been that there is 
no canonical decomposition of an image into parts (for survey and rebuttal, see Blumson 
2014: Ch. 6; c.f. Abell 2005: 192–4).  In the case of digital images, however, this worry 
seems ill-founded, as digital images are defined in terms of their atomic parts, namely 
pixels.  However, pixels may not be atomic meaningful image parts, i.e. they may be 
analogous to letters rather than morphemes.  If pixels are not atomic bearers of content, 
then some of the examples considered above do not count as counterexamples to inverse 
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compositionality.  For instance, suppose a single pixel of an image is changed to a random 
value, introducing noise while leaving content unaltered; the two images, before and after 
this change, will be related by H, yet if that single pixel is not itself a bearer of content, 
this example would not violate inverse compositionality—the change would be analogous 
to a mere variation in spelling rather than non-synonymous morpheme replacement.  
Consequently, the main challenge here is not to show that images may differ yet still be 
synonymous, this was demonstrated in §3, but rather to show that these differences occur 
at the level of content-bearing image parts.   
 A plausible first pass at an atomic meaningful image constituent is the uniform 
patch of color.  In the case of maps, for instance, regions of uniform color are treated as 
atomic constituents by Casati and Varzi (1999: 191–2).  Crucially, color patches 
contribute substantively to content: whether an image is of a red ball, or of a blue ball, 
depends upon the hue value of a (set of) color patch(es).  Likewise, color patches 
themselves are prima facie bearers of content, attributing, for instance, a particular surface 
property to a depicted surface.  A red patch in an image vehicle bears the content that 
some surface, or region, is red.12  However, we must be careful not to assume that a color 
patch always bears as content its own color.  In the case of fleshed out content, it is clear 
that colors may convey more elaborate meaning, they “can become correlated not with 
colours but with feelings and moods” (Bach 1970: 121).  Yet even the skeletal content of 
color patches may not be identified with precise color value; this follows already from 
clause (ii) of H, which indicates that it is relative color value, the relationship a color 
stands in to other possible colors, that is critical for image synonymy.  For instance, the 
dark stripes of blue on the underside of the wave in Fig. 1a and those in Fig. 1c bear the 
same content, despite differing in absolute value, since they stand in the same relative 
relationship to other colors in their respective images.  The color space as a whole for 1c is 
merely slightly desaturated relative to that for 1a.   
 However, the content of a color patch is not determined solely by the value it is 
assigned within the image color space.  Its skeletal content is also determined in part by its 
spatial relationship to other color patches in the image.  Consider, for instance, Edward !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Abell (2005) calls such regions “sub-pictorial parts,” defending the view that they bear content, and that 
this content is not determined by convention, since they are not “salient” to the “makers or interpreters” of 
images; consequently, the semantics of sub-pictorial parts is disanalogous to that of ambiguous words.  I take 
her arguments to complement and support those offered here. 
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Adelson’s “checkershadow illusion,” in which a cylinder casts a shadow across a 
checkerboard, yet the board has been cleverly arranged such that a “black” square outside 
the shadow and a “white” one within it have exactly the same reflective properties.  Here 
patches assigned precisely the same value in color space differ in what they are apt to 
depict: in one spatial context, a black square, and in another, a white square.  Thus, the 
skeletal content of a color patch is doubly contextual: it is determined on the one hand by 
its spatial position within the image, and on the other by the position of its color value 
within color space. 
 The double contextuality of skeletal content ensures that, in some instances, color 
patches may be replaced non-synonymously, and yet overall content remain unchanged.  
This is because in one spatial context a slight change in patch color may change what the 
image overall is apt to depict, while in a different spatial context, the very same slight 
change may have no effect whatsoever on image content.  Consider, for instance, Figure 
2a: the middle patch of the top stripe may be changed without any change in content (2b), 
while the middle patch in the bottom stripe may be changed in precisely the same way yet 
change content substantively (2c).  Or consider again Hokusai’s Great Wave: a white 
speckle located in one region may bear content, serving as a fleck of spray, yet a speckle of 
the very same color, shape, and size in another region may constitute mere noise or dirt.  
That a change in these small regions may change overall content indicates that they are 
indeed content-bearing.  However, that they may in some instances change—be replaced 
non-synonymously—without changing overall content indicates that image content as a 
whole is not uniquely determined by such content-bearers, i.e. is not inverse 
compositional. 
 
[Figure 2 about here, caption: 
The center square in both lines of (a) has exactly the same greyscale value (24%). In 
(b) the top one only has been darkened (to 35% grey), yet synonymy with (a) is 
preserved. In (c) the bottom one only has been darkened by exactly the same 
amount, yet this breaks synonymy with (a), since the bottom line is no longer apt to 
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 How may we reconcile the compositionality of images with the failure of inverse 
compositionality?  When we consider the details of an image “from the bottom up” as it 
were, examining constituents in isolation, we see fine-grained details, even individual 
pixels, as bearing the very same properties (colors) that determine content at larger grains.  
If we consider the image as a whole “from the top down,” however, as we “zoom in” from 
its holistic content to more and more fine-grained details, these at some point lose 
significance for the image as a whole, i.e. parts of the image no longer represent parts of 
the image’s subject.  A process of semantic decomposition that begins by revealing 
compositional structure eventually breaks down.  When I look very closely at the 
reproduction of Hokusai’s Great Wave on the printed page, I can see individual splashes of 
ink from the printing process, the “pixels” it comprises.  These details are disanalogous to 
the orthography of linguistic representations, they are individually assessable as bearing 
distinctively imagistic content (whereas in most cases, a letter considered in isolation does 
not bear linguistic content).  Nevertheless, I do not accept them as unique contributors to 
the overall content of the image qua Great Wave off Kanagawa, i.e. the content it shares 
with all other sufficiently high-resolution reproductions of Hokusai’s masterpiece.  So, 
from this perspective, the claim that images are compositional, but not inverse 
compositional, may be restated: images are compositional at one level of granularity, yet 
non-compositional at a finer level of granularity. 
 
§7. Thresholds and granularity 
 
The granularity at which synonymous digital images bear content is bounded in H by two 
parameters: δ and ε; but what sets these parameters?  One strategy in the content literature 
pins them to the limits of human perceptual power: images that differ in their physical 
properties may nevertheless be indistinguishable to us.13  I’ve argued here for a coarser !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 This is the “lack of effective differentiation” that Goodman and Elgin identify as distinctively pictorial 
(1988: 131).  Since perceptual indistinguishability is not transitive, representational systems that allow 
physical variance but perceptual indifference satisfy Goodman’s notion of a dense symbol scheme (1976: 
160).  However, Zeimbekis (2012) argues that digital images may be physically distinct, yet type-identical 
with respect to their representational properties, effectively demonstrating a threshold at which 
indistinguishability, and thus (for him) synonymy of digital images is transitive.  In contrast, I allow 
synonymous images to be perceptually distinguishable, yet still take synonymy to be strictly transitive.  This 
introduces a tension, however, as the everyday practices that determine the thresholds for synonymy are not 
themselves transitive.  Although this tension warrants further investigation, I set it aside here on the grounds 
that the algorithms discussed in the text, such as those for resizing images on screens or printing them to 
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granularity based on our everyday practice of treating images that differ slightly as 
nevertheless bearers of the very same content—Figures 1a and 1b differ in some respect, 
but that respect is not itself content-relevant.  The bounds on this coarser granularity are 
encapsulated in the algorithms we trust to reproduce, resize, and otherwise transform our 
digital images.  But under what circumstances do we trust these algorithms?  I think the 
answer reintroduces a precise role for context or perspective, not in determining content, 
but in delimiting it.   
 Consider again Hokusai’s Great Wave in Fig. 1a.  The image you are looking at as 
you read this paper, and the image I am looking at while writing it, will be of different 
resolutions, displayed in different color spaces, and thus related by H.  The algorithms 
that relate these two images will start from the high-resolution version available from the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art.  The image that I view while writing this has been 
downsampled to fit my laptop screen; the image you view may have been resampled in 
printing the paper to pdf (a question for the typesetter); if you view it electronically, it will 
also be up- or downsampled to fit the resolution of your screen, by an algorithm 
dependent on the software you use to view the pdf; if you are viewing the paper as a 
physical printout, then the image will have been downsampled to fit the resolution of the 
printer, and possibly the colorspace downsampled to greyscale if you did not print in color.  
By what standard can we assess whether these various images are appropriately 
synonymous, i.e. what are the relevant values of δ and ε?   
At the very least, you, the reader, need to be able to follow the discussion of 
Hokusai’s Great Wave in the text—if the image is downsampled so severely that the 
passengers in the forward boat cannot be identified, or their topknots distinguished, then 
image content has clearly changed.  Furthermore, you need to follow the textual discussion 
non-inferentially: if the image has been downsampled to greyscale, you can likely still 
identify the dark blue stripes on the underside of the wave, but the image itself only 
conveys the content that these stripes are darker than their neighbors; you must infer the 
stripes were originally blue from the text, your memory, or your inferential knowledge of 
waves.  Generalizing, it seems that in order for imagistic content to be the same across the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
paper, are treated as transitive, and it is this practical attitude that is the present explanandum.  I thank Ben 
Blumson for emphasizing to me the importance of this question. 
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two images, any detail of the first image to which I might potentially have drawn your 
attention needs to be available to you in the second image (and vice versa).   
The algorithms for downsampling digital images are designed to preserve as much 
imagistic content as possible, but whether they preserve enough content for the 
downsampled image to be synonymous with its parent depends on context—if we ask an 
algorithm to downsample an image past the threshold at which content is preserved, it will 
do so.  But if algorithms for resampling digital images can be made to “break” like this, 
degrading or losing content, what ensures that in the typical case they do preserve content?  
I think the answer extends beyond a rough parity in human perceptual acuity to broad 
commonalities in our expectations and purposes—not only do our eyes operate at roughly 
the same granularity, but our attention to detail is roughly the same, and our expectations 
about what others can and do see in an image is broadly stable across standard contexts of 
image sharing.  These common characteristics of our use of images, these facts about us 
and what we do, set the baseline threshold across which granularity of detail ceases to bear 
content.  It is because of such commonalities in how we perceive and interpret images that 
we all accept two photos struck from the same negative as bearing the same content, two 
showings of a film on screens of different resolutions as the same, and our respective 
instances of Figure 1 as both Hokusai’s Great Wave. 
We can now see the limited sense in which imagistic content is perspectival.  
Human perspective and use sets the threshold between content-bearing and non-content-
bearing aspects of an image.  Perspective does not determine content itself—that is just 
determined by facts about the distribution of colors within the image—, rather it delimits 
content, inscribing a boundary between meaningful and artifactual details.  Yes, this 
threshold may change with circumstances, interest, and ability; Figures 1a and 1c may be 
strictly synonymous for the collector of Ukiyo-e, but not for the historian of Japanese 
printmaking technology.  Nevertheless, because the role of perspective is merely to set a 
limit on content, it does not block the possibility of an objective analysis of imagistic 
content modulo this perspectival threshold.  This is good news for those who would 
develop a theory of imagistic content outside the realm of human artifacts, such as 
paintings and photographs, and apply it to features of the natural world, such as perceptual 
experience or mental content.14 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





Our everyday image-using practice accepts as synonymous images related by algorithmic 
transformations that alter their fine-grained details.  This observation implies a structural 
constraint on digital imagistic representation, namely: digital images are always non-
trivially compositional, but never inverse compositional.  This formulation reveals a 
fundamental contrast between imagistic and linguistic representations, since the latter may 
or may not be compositional, and may or may not be inverse compositional.  The semantic 
implication of this result is that, for any set of synonymous digital images, there is some 
granularity at which fine-grained details do not make unique contributions to content.  
The threshold at which this changeover from content-relevant to content-indifferent 
detail occurs is itself context dependent, determined by human perspective and use; 
nevertheless, a broad uniformity across all such contexts permits us to devolve synonymy 
assessments to algorithmic procedures, such as those from which our investigation began.  
Finally, the user-independent character of these procedures implies that perspective does 
not determine content, but merely delimits it—welcome news for would-be theories of 
imagistic content that extend beyond the arts. 
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